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About the Manifesto 
Safety science is stagnating 
In safety science, we have stopped competing empirically. A key symptom of this problem is 
the lack of high-quality intervention research. In a healthy field, we should expect to see 
experimentalists testing theories, feeding back into new theories. For safety, this means 
researchers and practitioners cooperating to test whether interventions based on the 
theories work. Instead, systematic reviews consistently show large volumes of publications 
on any safety theory, but very small volumes of (methodologically poor) intervention 
evaluations [10]–[12]. We research and teach about variations on many activities - hazard 
identification, risk assessment, safety cases, safety climate, safety leadership – but we lack 
an empirical basis on which to prefer any way of managing safety over any other.  
 
It would be pointless to ask, “How did we get into this situation?” All fields of research go 
through periods of relative stagnation, where activity is dominated by those who are 
content to research or practice within existing theories. Such tension between present and 
future consensus is what marks the punctuated equilibrium of scientific advancement in 
every field [8]. The important question is, “How did we get stuck here?” 
 
In a healthy research field there is empirical growth. Each research program competes to 
outmatch the others through making novel predictions, and having those predictions 
confirmed [9]. Safety Science has suffered from a gradual separation between its 
theoretical, empirical, and practical components. The theorists bicker whilst the empiricists, 
who should be adjudicating these arguments, are instead trapped within closed theoretical 
frameworks.   
 
The cause of the stagnation is a dysfunctional relationship between giants and dwarfs 
Isaac Newton once said, “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” 
This was not an original contribution by Sir Isaac, but a refinement of a much older 
metaphor in which dwarfs could see further than giants by standing on their shoulders. 
Modern thinking about safety is dominated by “giants” - broad theorists with persuasive 
ideas – Heinrich, Hollnagel, Hudson, Leveson, Perrow, Reason, Turner, Weick, Zohar and 
others. Whatever the giants lack in research rigor they make up for with compelling 
metaphors. They have the power of naming things, and the names, once bestowed, hold 
and perpetuate the power of the giants.  
 
Around the feet of the giants scurry industrious dwarfs. Each dwarf usually lives within the 
shadow of a single giant, applying and refining one big idea. Some dwarfs are not even 
aware of which giant towers over them. Such dwarfs may sincerely believe that they know 
most of what there is to know about safety, whilst actually only understanding a small slice 
of extant theory [1].  
 
Is this a fair picture of the safety academic community? No metaphor will ever capture the 
diversity of the safety researcher population, or the complexity of any individual research 
career. Still, everyone who regularly reads work within the safety literature is familiar with 
the gulfs between the work of theorists, the work of empiricists, and the work of 
practitioners. Each group has its distinctive problems. 
 
The theorists struggle with the foundational questions of the field. What is safety? What 
does it mean to treat safety as a science? Why do accidents happen? What are the 
appropriate objects of safety research and practice? They pose broad answers to these 
questions, but seldom refine their elaborate and eloquent theories into genuinely testable 
models or practices  [2]. 
 
The empiricists often appear unconcerned with, or even completely ignorant of, the 
foundational questions. They align themselves uncritically with the work of a single giant, 
applying or refining the theories without questioning the foundations. They test whether 
one variable in a safety climate model mediates two other variables, without considering 
whether any of the variables have ecological validity, e.g. Gao et al.  [3]. They report the 
results of a single application of an unvalidated method for assessing risk, e.g. Ilbahar et al.  
[4]. They test whether an intervention changes self-reported behaviour, ignoring the fact 
that self-reporting is itself a variable behaviour, e.g. Lusk et al.  [5].  
 
The practitioners conduct activities that are disconnected from research, guided more by 
standards and legislation than by either theory or evidence [6], [7]. They accumulate 
individual experience that speaks directly to the accuracy, relevance and usefulness of 
safety theory, but seldom collect or record this information in a way that can be credibly 
and reliably used to update the theory. They thus make very limited contributions to public 
knowledge. 
 
Our manifesto is a proposed solution for the stagnation 
The title of our paper includes the word “manifesto”. It is a personal statement of policy and 
commitment from us, with an invitation to others to make the same commitments. Our 
manifesto is written in first person to indicate that it is intended as self-reflective critique 
rather than personal attack. If readers see similarities to their own work within the 
problems we discuss, we hope that they will be provoked and challenged rather than 
offended.  
 
We introduce the term “Reality-based Safety Science”,  intended to evoke similar 
sentiments to the evidence-based medicine movement, with one important difference. 
Evidence-based medicine was a reaction to physicians’ over-reliance on intuition, personal 
experience and theoretical rationale [13]. Often the evidence existed but was not being 
used by practitioners. The problem we are facing in safety science stems from a lack of 
evidence production. We are conducting empirical work, but it is a naïve empiricism that is 
insufficiently informed by a critical understanding of existing theory. We are creating 
theories, but they are untestable edifices that tower well beyond the supporting evidence. 
There is systemic pressure placed on researchers to ground their work in untested models, 
reductionist categories, and proxy measurements, rather than on direct observation and 
sophisticated analysis of real people doing real work in real organisations.  
 
Hence, our manifesto calls for Reality-based Safety Science - where theory is grounded in 
rigorous observations of existing practice, and where practice is based on established 
theory. Reality-based Safety Science is based on the following commitments: 
 
1. We will investigate work as our core object of interest 
2. We will describe current work before we prescribe changes 
3. We will investigate and theorise before we start measuring 
4. We will directly observe the practices that we investigate 
5. We will position each piece of research in an appropriate disciplinary context, 
informed by research practices and recent advances in that discipline; 
6. When researching safety methods, we will prioritise real-world case studies over 
worked examples. 
7. We will treat practitioners as respected partners 
 
It is inevitable that any manifesto for the future is a critique of the past. For each “we will” 
in the preceding list there is an implicit “instead of the way it is usually done”. This paper is 
for publication in a special issue of the journal Safety Science titled The Future of Safety 
Science. It contains personal opinions and reasoned arguments. Whilst we criticise previous 
research, we do not criticise those who produced it. They are colleagues we respect, and in 
some cases, we consider them friends. They are giants, not demons, and we seek to stand 
on their shoulders rather than cut them down. We do not apologise for the spikes on our 
boots.  
Why the manifesto is needed 
Our basis for evaluating progress in safety science 
 
It would be arrogant for us, as safety researchers, to pass judgments about the general 
quality of safety science research as if we were impartial observers. There is a problem, and 
we are part of it. 
 
Our analysis of this problem is based on Imre Lakatos’s method of evaluating scientific 
progress [14]. For us, as for Lakatos, the appropriate unit of analysis is not an individual 
paper, or even a single theory, but a “research program” - an evolving sequence of theories. 
The problem is not “safety research is being executed badly” but “the safety research 
program is not making sufficient progress”. 
 
“Research program” is a scalable term. It can apply to an overall discipline such as “safety 
science”, a narrower group of ideas, such as “safety climate”, or a single evolving chain of 
theories within that group, such as “safety-specific trust”.  
 
All research programs have a theoretical “hard core” which cannot be successfully 
challenged without over-throwing the program, along with a contestable set of auxiliary 
hypotheses. The auxiliary hypotheses link the hard core with the observed world by 
providing ways to measure, test and apply the hard core. The auxiliary hypotheses form a 
protective belt around the hard core – any empirical anomalies are accommodated by 
adjusting the auxiliary hypotheses rather than by rejecting the hard core.  
 
For example, consider Newtonian physics as an explanation for the movement of planets. 
Newton’s three laws formed the hard core, and knowledge about the planets in our solar 
system formed the auxiliary hypotheses. Any movement of the planets in violation of the 
laws could be accommodated by hypothesising new planets. 
 
A research program is “progressive” under two conditions: 
 
1) Each new theory must have greater empirical content than its predecessors – it must 
describe, explain and predict novel phenomena; and 
2) At least some of this novel content must turn out to be true. 
 
The idea of “novelty” is relative to both other theories and to “common sense” 
expectations. If a theory makes predictions that no one else makes or expects, and those 
predictions turn out to be true, the program has made strong progress. If only the most 
obvious predictions of a theory turn out to be true – particularly if rival theories make the 
same predictions – the theory cannot claim to have made a novel contribution.  
 
There is room for a new theory to make wrong predictions, particularly if these can be 
explained away by adjusting the auxiliary hypotheses. However, once a program bogs down 
in constant adjustment of auxiliary hypotheses to explain away wrong predictions, at the 
expense of novel true content, the program has become degenerate.  
 
At first, Newtonian physics predicted new planets, and these were eventually discovered. 
One thing that couldn’t be explained was the changing orbit of Mercury. Various hypotheses 
were put forward, but none of these panned out. Eventually the degenerate Newtonian 
physics was replaced by General Relativity, with a new hard core that could satisfactorily 
explain Mercury’s orbit. General Relativity did more than explain things that Newtonian 
physics could not – it made new predictions that also turned out to be true.  
 
Our evaluation of safety science 
To the extent that safety science makes progress, it does so by adopting and customising 
progressive research programs from related fields. Once those programs become part of 
safety science, they usually cease making progress.  Key examples of this include the 
adoption of organisational culture as “safety culture”, behavioural psychology as 
“behavioural safety”, and theory X and theory Y as “Safety I and Safety II”. There are 
isolated examples of progressive research programs within safety science, but these 
programs are usually related to specific technologies or biological processes. In terms of 
novel and confirmed empirical content, safety science is usually where research programs 
come to die. 
 
This indictment of the field is not necessarily a judgement on any individual publishable unit 
of research. Exquisite rigour can be found within a degenerate research program. This can 
include novel ideas that turn out not to be true, or empirical investigations that challenge 
the current auxiliary hypotheses. An overall research program, though, must be judged on 
its forward progress.  
 
We ask our readers to reflect on the following research programs: 
 
“Safety climate” was introduced in 1980 by Dov Zohar as a specific type of organisational 
climate [15]. The concept built upon existing organisational science research outside of the 
field of safety and made new empirical predictions specific to the causation and prevention 
of accidents. Forty years later, how much progress has been made, according to Lakatos’s 
criteria? There are many variations on the theme of safety climate. There are many 
instruments for measuring safety climate, and many commercial programs for improving 
safety climate. But where is the sequence of theories making progressively novel and 
empirically confirmed predictions? It took the safety community almost three decades 
before a few authors [16], [17] started to seriously question the conceptual and 
methodological limitations inherent in culture and climate surveys/questionnaires, or the 
fact that organisational climate scholarship has not been convincing in resolving its own 
critical problems. These problems include confusion with constructs like job-satisfaction and 
leadership, and the theoretical inconsistency of aggregating individual/psychological climate 
perceptions to represent organisational wide climate. Such criticisms were active in 
organisational climate scholarship long before they were acknowledged by safety climate 
researchers [18]–[20]. 
 
“System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes” (STAMP) was introduced by Nancy 
Leveson in 2004 as a new accident model [21]. STAMP applied General Systems Theory to 
the specific problem of accident causation. The STAMP research program had similarities 
with other “systems thinking” approaches to safety, but included novel empirical content. 
STAMP has been widely adopted, and is the subject of many “case study” papers -  e.g. 
Ouyang, Hung, Yu & Fei [22] among many others - but has made no theoretical progress 
since its introduction. STAMP is almost exactly the same theory as it was in 2004. Models 
such as Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) [23] present alternate applications 
of General Systems Theory to safety, with a similar proliferation of derivative papers, but 
safety science is yet to find a case where the models make different, testable predictions, so 
that one model can be empirically preferred over the others [24]. Meanwhile, outside of 
safety, the pursuit of a universal General Systems Theory has been replaced by domain-
specific and application-specific approaches to modelling complexity [25].  
 
“Safety Cases” were first mentioned in the journal Safety Science in 1996, as a reference to 
an already wide-spread industry practice [26]. For a short time, researchers enriched the 
existing practice by adapting Toulmin’s models of argumentation structure to understand 
how safety arguments were constructed, undermined and adapted. This theoretical work 
was very quickly transformed into a simplified notation for representing safety cases, along 
with a set of prescriptive practices for applying and reviewing the notation [27]. There is 
little to no work that investigates whether (and if so, how) safety cases lead to safer 
systems. In 2016, a cross-industry review published in Safety Science and co-authored by 
some of the original researchers, suggested, as an article highlight, that “Research about 
effectiveness of safety cases is required” [28]. Twenty years of academic discussion of a pre-
existing industrial practice has delivered a wealth of elaboration, and a near-total absence 
of evaluation.  Meanwhile, safety cases (or their equivalent) are used by practitioners and 
regulators in almost every international safety critical industry (e.g. aviation, maritime, rail, 
oils and gas, nuclear) as the central instrument of confirmation that a system or technology 
is safe. 
 
Safety climate, STAMP, and safety cases were all empirically interesting theories. They 
offered new ways to interpret and explain existing data, and they made novel predictions. 
All three approaches were quickly and widely adopted by industry, creating a potential 
wealth of data to test the predictions and progress the theories. Instead, researchers 
devoted their efforts to elaborating and applying the theories in ways that did not add 
empirical content through prediction or confirmation. There are more tools, more methods, 
more guidance, and more case studies of applications, but very little more evidence about 
what works or doesn’t work.  
 
The pattern of program stagnation 
To avoid giving specific offence, the three examples above are representative, and hold no 
special status. The same charges can be laid against behavioural safety, risk assessment, 
normal accidents, high reliability organisations, resilience engineering and Safety II. There is 
no shortage of examples that fit the following pattern: 
1. An existing research program from a field that aligns with or overlaps with safety 
science; 
2. a translation of the program into the safety domain, usually in a way that adds novel 
empirical content through the specific application to safety; 
3. widespread industry adoption of the early ideas and models presented by the 
program, before they have been empirically tested; and 
4. a large body of research literature that elaborates and applies the early ideas and 
models, whilst neither increasing the volume of confirmed empirical content, nor 
making novel predictions for testing. 
 
Davis [29] makes a compelling case that all interesting social theories attack the prevailing 
assumptions of their audience. Rigorously constructed theories that fit in with the status 
quo may be accepted as true, but they do not have real value, because they do not change 
what we already know. New safety theories are often interesting, but they seldom advance 
knowledge beyond this initial splash of attention. When they are not advancing whole new 
theories, most publications in safety aren’t even interesting in a Davis sense. 
 
Reality-based Safety Science commits itself to advancing the hard core of safety. We will 
seek to identify and challenge the assumptions that shape safety practice. We will transform 
dogmatic assertions into testable predictions. We will test those predictions. 
 
Commitment 1 - We will investigate work, rather than accidents, as 
our core object of interest 
Issue giving rise to this commitment 
Safety science studies two main categories of things – accidents, and work.  
 
Of these two categories, accidents are the most interesting and least useful objects of 
investigation. They can almost never be studied except through secondary data that has 
already been filtered and interpreted by investigators. As rare and complex events, each 
accident affords too many interpretations to challenge and update existing theories. 
Accidents are good communication tools [30], but they are dangerous distractions for safety 
researchers. Accidents do not read, understand and abide by our models of accident 
causation. 
 
The study of accidents consistently leads safety researchers into the trap of drawing 
conclusions about how work is, and how work should be, based on single instances of work 
that, by definition, have unusual outcomes. As Hollnagel [31], Dekker [32], and Amalberti 
[33] have discussed eloquently and at length, it is not possible even to determine what 
makes an accident unusual by studying that accident.  
 
Foundation of this commitment 
Setting aside accidents, then, this leaves “work” as the core object of interest for safety 
science. Work is a catholic concept that includes engineering and design, management, 
regulation, analysis, social interaction, education, and many other activities. Safety 
researchers and practitioners often differentiate themselves based on the domain of work 
they examine. The safety of design work is often treated as a special sub-discipline under 
labels such as “system safety” or “safety engineering”. The safety of medical work is also 
often treated as a special subdiscipline under the label “patient safety”.  
 
For the purpose of this commitment, we do not differentiate between different domains of 
work. We recognise that there are bespoke challenges to studying design and medical work, 
but we do not accept that there are fundamental epistemological differences between 
researching work programming aviation software and researching work building fences. 
Each type of work is performed by humans, and can be influenced by the psychological state 
of the worker and the social meaning that the worker gives to the work. Each type of work 
can be represented, with imperfect fidelity, through standardised models and procedures. 
Each type of work varies in its performance, and may lead to an accident.  
 
Safety science is interested in the aspects of work that make it safe or unsafe. As a matter of 
practical scope, rather than a foundational assumption, safety science is concerned with 
aspects of work that are generalisable across organisations and domains. For example, 
research to develop more stable airframes, or to write software that more closely matches 
its specifications, may certainly be relevant for safety. However, the primary audiences for 
such work are airframe engineers and software developers. Safety science is not directly 
interested in how to design airframes or write software. The work of both airframe 
designers and software developers may be studied to draw broader conclusions about how 
organisations support design workers in creating safe designs. That is the remit of safety 
science.  
 
One type of work that is unquestionably generalisable is work done by, or at the direction 
of, safety practitioners. This “safety work” is not strictly necessary for the accomplishment 
of business goals, and would often not take place if safety were not a concern in its own 
right [34]. Despite the wealth of literature telling safety practitioners how to do their jobs, 
there is surprisingly little empirical investigation of safety work [35]. 
 
Specifics of this commitment 
Almost all research questions in Reality-based Safety Science should be questions about 
work.  
• How does work happen? 
• How do workers make sense of the work that they do? 
• How does work vary in the short term? What factors cause it to vary or stay the 
same? 
• What events that occur during work are meaningful for workers? How do workers 
interpret these events? 
• How does work change over longer periods of time? How are practices shared and 
improved? How does work respond to external influences?  
• Who performs work? How does their identity influence the work? 
• Where does work take place? How does the nature of work change according to its 
environment? 
• How is work organised? What is the effect of the organisation of work on the 
conduct of work? 
• What counts as core work, and what is discretionary? What is the relationship 
between non-core work activities (in particular safety work) and the conduct of core 
work?  
 
Note that these are not intrinsically questions about safety, but any answers to these 
questions form the building blocks of new theories of safety. Studying work gives 
researchers access to data that the existing theories of safety already say is important, and, 
unlike the study of rare accidents, offers new instances of such data to every safety 
researcher entering the field.  
 
Reality-based Safety Science commits itself to studying generalisable phenomena relating to 
work. We will pay particular attention to both safety work, and those aspects of operational 
work that safety work is intended to influence. 
 
Reality-based Safety Science eschews artificial distinctions between different types of work, 
particularly where such distinctions are used to divide the safety research community.  
 
Reality-based Safety Science recognises the limits of accident research for anything other 
than very preliminary theory building.  
Commitment 2 – We will describe current work before we prescribe 
changes 
Issue giving rise to this commitment 
It is very tempting to attempt to influence safety practice by writing prescriptions. Young 
researchers, in particular, fall prey to the idea that advancing safety requires proposing new 
tools and techniques. This idea can be reinforced by academic program rules that require a 
“novel contribution”, and implicitly or explicitly recognise novelty of methods more readily 
than novelty of observation, analysis or evaluation. As a result, there are thousands of 
Master and PhD theses each presenting a new method for hazard analysis. Collectively, this 
work forms a methods lottery. In the unlikely event that a method is adopted by industry, a 
researcher can build an entire career out of applying and refining the method. Much more 
likely, such research fails to answer any question that a practitioner is interested in the 
answer to.  
 
Current theories suggest that accidents happen when work varies in uncontrolled ways [21], 
when it fails to adapt to changed circumstances [36], when it drifts into routinely unsafe 
practice [37], or when it was organised with insufficient safeguards [38]. These theories, to 
the extent that they say anything about how safety should be practiced, are cautionary tales 
about the limited ability of technical solutions to solve socio-technical problems.   
 
Any prescriptive safety analysis method that claims to be informed by socio-technical safety 
theory is a contradiction in terms. If the safety research community is serious about 
acknowledging the socio-technical and cultural conceptions of organisations as open 
systems, then it is time for us to give up on providing “solutions” that treat safety as an 
output from a closed mechanical system.  
The type of research that will best support current work practices is research that is deeply 
informed by those practices. It is unreasonable to expect to advance the industrial use of 
safety cases by studying how academics use safety cases, or to improve hazard 
identification by enhancing a published method that no one currently uses.  
 
Foundation of this commitmentAt the heart of Reality-based Safety Science is a deep 
interest in the current practice of safety work and operational work. By describing these 
things back to safety practitioners in new ways, we seek to give them improved 
understanding and capability to do their jobs.  
 
“Describing” encompasses much more than raw data collection. Descriptive research 
encompasses: 
• Making direct and indirect observations of the thing being studied (which in turn 
includes a wide range of data collection methods); 
• analysing and modelling the thing being studied; and 
• assessing and evaluating the thing being studied.  
 
Reality-Based Safety Science is based on a virtuous cycle of studying current practice in 
order to advance theory, and applying theory to advance current practice.  
 
Given the current state of knowledge and practice in safety, Reality-based Safety Science is 
likely to be dominated by descriptive research for the near future. Once a better 
understanding of current practice has been achieved, there will be many opportunities for 
intervention research. At present, however, safety interventions are very seldom based on 
theory [39]. This is inevitable, given how divorced the theories are from safety practice, and 
how a-theoretical most safety practice is.  
 
How should a safety practitioner, encountering Safety II for the first time, change their day-
to-day activities? How should a supervisor take recent advances in safety climate theory 
into account when performing inductions? Where does systems thinking fit into a safety 
management system? These should be questions with easy and well researched answers. 
They are not.  
 
Specifics of this commitment 
Reality-based Safety Science commits itself to publishing research with clearly expressed 
research questions, where the answers to those questions are helpful to practitioners. We 
will describe real work, in real organisations, in new and interesting ways. We will build our 
theories of safety from the answers to these questions, so that the theories have immediate 
relevance.  
 
Reality-based Safety Science is cautious about the creation and refinement of new safety 
work methods as a goal of safety research. We recognise that methods can be a practical 
way to both communicate and test theory, but we are concerned that methods are seldom 
used in this way. The magnification of “swiss cheese” from a simple cartoon into the most 
widely applied “theory” of accident causation [2] is a cautionary tale, not a success story. 
Commitment 3 - We will investigate and theorise before we start 
measuring 
Issue giving rise to this commitment 
Most quantitative research in safety involves the measurement of attributes of phenomena 
that are interesting because they are believed to be related to safety. Safety researchers 
usually adopt the jargon of behavioural psychology by referring to these measurements as 
“constructs”.   
 
Safety scientists measure constructs relating to, amongst others: 
● leadership (e.g. leaders’ self-reported styles); 
● climate (e.g. worker perceptions of organisational priorities); 
● culture (e.g. organisational response to errors); 
● behaviour (e.g. compliance rates with wearable equipment rules); and 
● individual perception of safety (e.g. self-reported pro-social behaviour).  
 
Unfortunately, we started quantifying these constructs long before the phenomena were 
qualitatively investigated or theorised (at least within the safety domain). As a result, to the 
extent that there are theories of safety leadership, safety climate, safety culture, safety 
behaviour or safety perception, these theories are assemblages of relationships between 
constructs that lack ecological validity. We do not have adequate descriptions or 
explanations of the phenomena, so we do not know what real-world referents the 
constructs are truly associated with.  
 
In many cases, it is not even clear whether different constructs are different attributes of 
the same phenomena, different theoretical conceptualisations of the same attributes, or 
discrete but related phenomena. For example, what is the ontological relationship between 
an individual’s perception of their leaders’ commitment to safety, and their organisation’s 
safety climate? Is perception a dimension of safety climate, an alternate conceptualisation 
of safety climate, or something separate from safety climate? This ontological problem 
needs to be resolved before it even makes sense to investigate the causal relationship 
between the perception and the climate. 
 
As Ioannidis [45] points out in his famous paper “Why most published research findings are 
false”, when a large number of comparisons are made between variables, with low prior 
plausibility for any particular outcomes, there will be a high rate of published false positives. 
This applies particularly to significance testing using p-values. To have a high chance of 
being true, a statistical comparison needs to start with a plausible hypothesis, and a 
sufficient understanding of the context to control for most sources of variation. Otherwise it 
is just searching for patterns in noise.  
 
In safety science we have developed the habit of tinkering with flying cars. We do not know 
if the cars are touching the ground, and if not, what miraculous force is keeping them in the 
air. These are important issues to investigate, but instead we ask how the heater is 
connected to the radiator. This question matters, we say, because no one has yet answered 
whether the relationship between cabin temperature and engine temperature is mediated 
by the capacity of the heat exchanger.  
 
Knowing the relationships between two constructs in a safety model is meaningless unless 
that relationship has significance for the practice of safety. If neither construct is observable 
except in a psychometric survey, then neither construct is grounded in the practice or 
experience of safety. It is important to understand the real-world meaning of our constructs 
before we worry about the statistical relationships between them.  
 
Foundation of this commitment 
This is not to say that quantitative research in safety is inherently unreliable. Quantitative 
research is necessary and important - but a rigorous quantitative study starts with a theory. 
From the theory comes a proposed relationship between variables, and from that 
relationship comes a hypothesis. Disproving the hypothesis should shake the theory to its 
core, requiring careful rebuilding to resurrect the theory.  
 
The concept of “trust”, particularly as investigated by Stacy Conchie [40]–[42], illustrates the 
desirable blend of theory building and measurement. Prior to this research program, trust 
was referred to uncritically as a desirable part of safety culture. Conchie and her colleagues 
began with qualitative investigations to build a theory of safety-specific trust and distrust. 
This theory suggested that trust and distrust both had positive and negative connotations 
for safety and made predictions about how organisations could change trust and distrust in 
ways that would improve safety. The research program then moved into a quantitative 
phase that tested how organisations could change worker trust.  
 
Whilst “safety specific trust” and “safety climate” papers often appear superficially similar – 
using survey results to test the relationships between dependent and independent variables 
– the key difference is that trust has a strong mechanistic explanation for the relationships 
being tested. This means that each quantitative result has clear implications for how leaders 
should seek to manage safety. Often the quantitative results lead on to more qualitative 
investigation of safety practices. As Conchie et al [43] wrote: 
 
“If management is to achieve safer behaviours from employees, then it is important that we 
understand precisely what underpins leader-focused strategies, and other strategies, that 
appear to promote safe behaviour. This may require research examining the role of 
presumptive trust processes, but it is also likely to require further study of trust formed 
through the longer-term development of relationship and actual experience. Only then can 
we identify what it is that needs to be done in an efficient way.”  
  
It is tragic that this work is mostly cited to support the unsophisticated claim that “safety 
leadership” is important for safety, usually in the introduction to a survey-analysis study 
that eschews the sophisticated and empirical theory of trust that Conchie and her 
colleagues developed in favour of unvalidated constructs. See Huang et al [44]  as a typical 
example of this. Huang cites Conchie positively, and then uses “supervisory safety 
communication” as a construct to test hypotheses such as “Supervisory safety 
communication will moderate the relationship of group-level safety climate with safety 
performance.”   
 
Specifics of this commitment 
Reality-based Safety Science commits itself to describing the real-world phenomena that 
create, correlate with, emerge from or are otherwise associated with safety or its absence. 
We will, where possible, identify measurable aspects of the phenomena. When seeking to 
change these measurable aspects, we will confirm that the phenomena itself is changing, 
not just the measurement.  
 
Reality-based Safety Science eschews putting “safety” in front of phenomena such as 
“leadership” and “climate” and assuming that a new phenomenon has thereby been 
identified.  
 
Reality-based Safety Science recognises the limits of statistical significance testing for any 
purpose other than testing already plausible relationships between properly theorised 
constructs. 
Commitment 4 – We will directly observe the practices that we are 
investigating 
Issue giving rise to this commitment 
Precision is not a solution to epistemic uncertainty. A mercury thermometer in Brisbane 
cannot measure the temperature in Chicago. Replacing the thermometer with a network of 
precision thermistors will not help. Using expert judgement through an Analytic Hierarchy 
Process to weight the input of each thermistor to the temperature calculation will still not 
help.  
 
Data that does not match the research question is bad data.  
 
Here are some common types of inappropriate data use in Safety Science, along with 
examples: 
 
● self-interested reports used as measures of quality, such as safety personnel 
reporting on the quality of safety management in their organisation, e.g. Santos et 
al. [46] and Stolzer et al. [47]; 
● self-reported behaviour used as measures of behaviour, such as individuals 
describing their own safety conduct, e.g. Kievik et al. [48]; 
● guesses at frequencies or risks being represented as actual risk, such as individuals 
ranking hazards based off their own perception of risk, e.g. Sanni-Anibire et al. [49]; 
● arbitrary measures of importance used as objective measures, such as individuals 
ranking the importance of hazards or control measures, e.g. Andrić and Lu [50]; and 
● frequency of reported events used as frequencies of events, such as historical 
reports of accident frequencies used as an outcome variable in studies to determine 
the relationship between safety climate and injuries, e.g. Young [51].  
 
Inappropriate data stays as inappropriate data no matter how it is processed. Dekker and 
Nyce [52] describe the problem of “ontological alchemy” in human factors, where subjective 
judgements are transmuted into apparently objective numbers. Safety Science also 
experiences this problem, as well as several other forms of alchemy: 
 
● using fuzzy logic, neural networks, or other algorithms that operate by differentially 
weighting data items in order to combine multiple dubious sources of data, e.g. Liu 
and Tsai [53]; 
● following Analytic Hierarchy Process, Delphi, Multi Criteria Decision Analysis or other 
expert decision-making mechanisms to reach a social consensus on an empirical 
question, e.g. Janackovic et al.  [54];  
● using “big data” techniques to identify clusters between variables, without an 
underlying research question, e.g. Carter et al.  [55]; and 
● reporting the outputs of unvalidated quantitative risk assessment models as 
objective measures of risk, e.g. Zhou and Liu [56].  
 
It is no co-incidence that all of the examples in the preceding lists involve quantitative 
survey research. Most data problems in safety arise from an inability by researchers to 
directly observe the phenomena that they are interested in measuring. It is irrelevant 
whether this inability comes from cost, difficulty in gaining access, demand to produce 
publications, or methodological difficulties – the consequence is a futile attempt to 
transmute lead into gold. 
 
Foundation of this commitment 
The central activity for Reality-based Safety Science is the examination of work practices. 
There are many different legitimate ways to find out about work, including interviews, 
surveys, document analysis and electronic measurements. All of these methods make 
epistemological sacrifices. The reality of work is different from: 
• how the rules say that work is done [57]; 
• how organisations formally understand and represent their work [58]; and 
• how workers describe the work in interviews and documents [59]. 
 
Unfortunately for the state of knowledge in safety science, it is often this very gap between 
work practices and how those activities are understood and represented (sometimes called 
work-as-done versus work-as-imagined) that is critical to understanding what makes work 
safe and unsafe [60]. As researchers, if our own data is merely a re-representation of work-
as-imagined, we can never really see the problems that we are trying to describe.  
 
Examining work practices means more than simply documenting what is going on at a 
particular place and time. To understand a practice, we need both chronicles and discourses 
– the actions and their meanings [61]. A researcher observing work should look at the 
relationships between practices, how these practices are produced and re-produced, what 
their underlying assumptions and meanings are, and what this might imply in terms of 
workplace tensions and power relations. None of this is possible, however, without 
observing what is going on.  
 
For example, when investigating “safety leadership”, we should be trying to identify and 
observe the practices that make up leadership. We will, of course, interview safety leaders, 
but interviews provide information about the interpretation and meaning of the practices, 
not information about the practices themselves. To understand the practices, we should see 
what a leader does. We need to see for ourselves what goes on in formal meetings and 
informal interactions. We should compare those observations to what both the leader and 
others say about what happened.  
 
Specifics of this commitment 
In the absence of reliable and consistent ways to measure the likelihood of most types of 
accidents, Reality-based Safety Science must steer away from making broad causal claims. 
This can be achieved by observing and describing mechanisms, and by measuring the 
operation of those mechanisms. For example, if a particular leadership behaviour is thought 
to enhance safety by improving a particular aspect of worker knowledge, it may be possible 
to find ways to measure both the behaviour and the knowledge. The overall claim about 
enhancing safety can probably not be directly evaluated.   
 
Reality-based Safety Science commits itself to observing and measuring the phenomena 
that we seek to describe. We will use proxy measurements only to the extent that the proxy 
has been demonstrated to be a reliable and consistent indicator of the actual phenomenon 
of interest. We will use numerical methods to explore and explain data, rather than to 
obscure problems.    
 
Reality-based Safety Science eschews self-reporting of things that could and should be 
counted.  
 
Reality-based Safety Science recognises the limits of quantitative surveys for measuring 
anything other than individual psychological constructs. 
Commitment 5 — We will position each piece of research in an 
appropriate disciplinary context, informed by research practices and 
recent advances in that discipline  
 
Issue giving rise to this commitment 
Safety is not a fully independent research discipline. It does not have canon literature. It 
does not have conventions for the design, execution or publication of research. A researcher 
who only cites safety literature, or who bases their methods and practices on what they 
read in the safety literature, is unlikely to be performing work that would be recognised at a 
high standard outside of safety science.  
 
Some common examples in safety are: 
● work situated within safety culture or safety climate that does not take into account 
advances in organisational theory outside of safety [63]; 
● work involving the elicitation and processing of expert opinions that does not 
consider the methodological problems with expert opinion aggregation raised in the 
economics literature about forecasting [64]; 
● work involving risk assessment that does not engage with the conceptual difficulties 
of defining and characterising risk [65]; and 
● discussion of behaviour change that uses theories from social psychology that failed 
when serious attempts were made to replicate the original experimental results [66].   
(The citations above are to works which describe rather than exemplify the problems.) 
 
 
Foundation of this commitment 
Safety science draws on many research disciplines for ideas, perspectives, and methods. As 
a non-exhaustive list, papers published in the journal Safety Science reference work from 
behavioural psychology, organisational psychology, engineering, social science, biomedicine, 
marketing, administrative science, mathematics, law, and human resources. All of these 
fields study the way work is performed. What makes something part of “safety”, rather than 
any of these other fields, is interest in the way work is associated with the causes and 
consequences of accidents.  
 
It is legitimate and important to have a field of “safety” research. The study of safety is  
concerned with things that don’t happen - dynamic non-events [62]. These non-events can 
be overlooked unless specially examined. There is also a lot in common between safety in 
one field and safety in another. It makes sense to talk about patient safety in the same 
journal as airline safety, if there are lessons from one that apply to the other. However, the 
link to accidents is seldom enough to fully differentiate a “safety” topic from its associated 
disciplines. In this sense, safety science is multidisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary. 
Safety may be approached using the methods and theories of many disciplines, but it does 
not stand outside those disciplines. Any advance in the “parent” discipline – in particular 
advancement, criticism or contradiction of existing theories - is likely to apply also to the 
safety application of theories from that discipline.   
 
For any given safety topic, there will be many potentially relevant parent disciplines. Where, 
for example, should a researcher or practitioner look for knowledge about safety in a 
moving crowd? Crowds are discussed by researchers interested in civil rights, emergency 
services, urban design, complex systems modelling, psychology, fluid mechanics, computer 
vision, animal behaviour, and social history. No individual researcher can have a 
comprehensive understanding of all of the knowledge that may be relevant for a particular 
safety topic. 
 
Specifics of this commitment 
Reality-based Safety Science commits itself to identifying the parent discipline for every 
project. We will situate our projects within the current literature of the parent discipline. 
We will abide by the methodological standards and norms of the parent discipline. We will 
subject our work to the scrutiny of experts in the parent discipline. We will seek to make 
findings that advance the parent discipline, rather than merely apply it to safety.  
 
Reality-based Safety Science eschews the overuse of “safety” as a keyword in literature 
searches, because of the risk this causes of ignoring relevant advances in parent disciplines.  
Commitment 6 – When researching safety methods, we will prioritise 
real-world case studies over worked examples 
Issue giving rise to this commitment 
When making or evaluating claims about safety methods, there are several layers of context 
for each claim. A method might vary in effectiveness based on many factors, including: 
• whether it is applied by researchers, or by practitioners; 
• whether it is applied by its creators, or by a third party after training; 
• whether it is applied to a specially chosen example, or a typical example; 
• the amount of time and resource available to apply the method; and 
• the completeness of information available to apply the method. 
 
 
A worked example considers a method, applied by researchers, to a specially chosen 
example that can be tailored to suit the method, invariably with scale and complexity 
smaller than a real industrial application but information and resources more readily 
available than on a real project. Such a method application can answer some questions 
about the properties of the method, such as how much effort is required, or whether the 
method is capable of finding a particular result (for example whether a hazard modelling 
process can, in principal, describe a known hazard). There are times when answers to such 
questions are important and interesting. These occasions are much rarer than the use of 
worked examples in the safety literature.  
 
Safety literature is currently dominated by inappropriate use of worked examples, 
mislabelled as “case studies”, at the expense of actual real-world case studies.  
 
Of particular and recent concern is the treatment of uncertainty within risk assessments and 
safety cases. Several types of problem dominate real-world application of risk assessment 
[68]: 
• Incorrect specification of the scope of the assessment; 
• failure to consider major sources of risk; 
• inappropriate selection of data; 
• incorrect assumptions; 
• inappropriate use of models; and 
• systematic errors in the conduct of the assessment.  
 
The safety academic community has shown very little concern for these problems. They are 
recognised in industrial literature – see e.g. Crawford [69] – but the academic focus has 
been on how to measure and represent uncertainty within assessment methods, as 
illustrated by Denny, Pai and Habli [70]. This distracts from  rather than solves any of the 
real-world problems with uncertainty.  
 
Arguably, there is a spiral where researchers become increasingly concerned with the 
technical intricacies of modelling reality as a way to hide from the foundational problem 
that safety models do not represent reality. Springer, Haas and Porowski [71] describe this 
as a general problem in applied policy research. Researchers, in order to make problems 
tractable, ignore details that are necessary for solutions that work in the real world. They 
write: “Policy makers and implementers cannot escape from the messy and wicked 
elements of problem reality; they live within them. Policy researchers can and often do 
retreat into the relative safety of tame problems and technical solutions. This can allow a 
claim of authority through conformity to method” [71]. We suggest that the broader 
problem is a narrow conception of “rigour” which sometimes manifests as conformity to 
method, and sometimes as a pre-occupation with logical correctness at the expense of real-
world validity.   
 
Foundation of this commitment 
The term “case study” has been abused so often and thoroughly in safety research that we 
are reluctant to provide this commitment without some basic definitions.  
 
By case study, we mean “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” [67]. 
 
In contrast, a worked example is an explanatory device that applies a method, step by step, 
to a well understood problem, in order to illustrate how the method works.  
When used to examine safety practices, the key differences between a case study and a 
worked example are: 
 
1. A case study occurs in a real-life context. The phenomena under investigation would 
occur whether or not a researcher was present to observe it. 
2. In a case study, researchers try to limit their own influence, so that any outcomes 
can be ascribed to the activities of practitioners, not the activities of researchers. 
3. A case study involves research questions. A worked example is used to communicate 
research that has already been performed.   
 
Case studies are vitally important for advancing the state of knowledge about safety 
methods. Without knowing how methods are used in practice, and the challenges and 
problems with the methods in practice, researchers are poorly equipped to suggest 
improvements.  
 
Specifics of this commitment 
Reality-based Safety Science commits itself to suggesting improvements to methods based 
on a close examination of how those methods are currently used. We will seek to improve 
the methods in ways that will make them easier and more effective to apply. We will make 
specific and testable claims about the improvements. We will test those claims. 
 
Reality-based Safety Science eschews the use of the term “case study” for any safety 
method application performed by researchers. 
 
Reality-based Safety Science recognises the limits of worked examples for answering most 
meaningful research questions. 
Commitment 7 – We will treat practitioners as respected partners 
Issue giving rise to this commitment 
Safety researchers have a bad habit of treating practitioners like misbehaving children. No 
sub-field of safety is exempt from this. Software safety researchers blame practitioners for 
failing to adopt methods that the researchers think are obviously better than current 
practice [72]. Accident theorists don’t understand why investigators persist in applying 
outdated models [73].  Safety II researchers are ostentatiously sympathetic to the local 
expertise and situation-specific constraints of almost every worker, except those who have 
“safety” in their job title [74].  
 
If the published literature were taken as an accurate representation of the relationship 
between academia and industry for safety, the lifecycle of a typical innovation in safety 
would be: 
1. A researcher develops and presents a new method 
2. Researchers (often the same as or affiliated with the first researcher) apply the 
method in hindsight to show how it could have prevented a famous accident 
3. Industry practitioners apply the method with no formal measurement, evaluation or 
comparison, and declare the application to be successful 
4. Further researchers elaborate the method or show how to apply it in new situations 
5. Industry practitioners apply the method in a wider range of situations, with no 
formal measurement, evaluation or comparison, and declare the application to be 
successful 
6. Researchers publish reviews of the application of the method, and declare it to be 
successful because of its wide adoption and the large number of papers about it 
 
We could have given illustrative citations in the above list, but we have not. There are 
simply too many papers in safety that could be accurately summarised as “Yet Another 
ACRONYM Paper” - readers may insert their own acronym - perhaps selecting from STAMP, 
GSN, FTA, HAZOP, WBA, ICAM -  or join us in condemning the general phenomenon of 
YAAPing at safety conferences.  
 
Foundation of this commitment 
Safety researchers and safety practitioners should be working together, but this should be in 
genuine knowledge-producing partnerships, rather than leader-follower relationships. Such 
partnerships should recognise the expertise that each party can provide. Researchers base 
their expertise on systematic public knowledge. Their contribution to research comes 
through their skills as researchers – they are expert in study design, data collection, and 
analysing and interpreting data. Safety practitioners are expert in managing safety within 
their organisational context. Safety practitioners have access to detailed, local data that is 
often hidden to outsiders.  
 
Researchers are well-positioned to advise practitioners on how to test and measure 
interventions. They may be able to describe broad patterns and theories to help 
practitioners to select which interventions are most likely to be effective. However, a 
medical researcher would never tell a doctor what to prescribe to a particular patient. 
Medical researchers know that only doctors have access to local knowledge about the 
circumstances, history and preferences of the patient. Similarly, safety researchers should 
be providing practitioners with options rather than constraints [74]. 
 
Following the standard practice in medical trials, safety researchers could develop the habit 
of making their research programs known to industry, and inviting eligible organisations to 
volunteer as participants. They could also establish mechanisms for practitioners to 
regularly report back on what they are seeing in the population that requires further 
enquiry.  
 
Such a partnership should work both ways. In the absence of specific local knowledge to the 
contrary, practitioners should be guided by the best available evidence of what generally 
works. Where there is no such evidence, practitioners should proceed cautiously, and 
should cooperate with researchers to advance the state of evidence, rather than operating 
beyond it.  
 
This applies particularly to practitioners working on behalf of regulatory or standards 
bodies. Formal prescriptions for practice that extend beyond the available evidence 
unnecessarily constrain both researchers and practitioners. “I would like to improve safety, 
but then I would be non-compliant” is both a common refrain and a damning indictment on 
the state of safety regulations. There is some evidence that safety researchers routinely 
become implicated in this problem by overstepping role boundaries to act as regulatory 
practitioners [74], [75].  
 
Specifics of this commitment 
Reality-based Safety Science commits itself to treating safety practitioners as respected 
participants or partners in safety research. We will defer to practitioners on local, practical 
knowledge, and seek to communicate knowledge that generalises beyond local 
circumstances and practical applications.  
  
Reality-based Safety Science eschews making recommendations for standards or regulation, 
except as outputs from research that directly studies work performed by regulators or 
constrained by regulation. 
Conclusion 
Any reader who agrees with our manifesto so far probably has their own pet explanation for 
how safety science came to be in such as sorry state.  
 
There is a tradition in safety of stakeholders describing each other as constraints preventing 
high-quality empirical research. The day-to-day work of safety practitioners is heavily 
constrained by organisational objectives and directives [7]. The safety management systems 
of organisations are responsive to legislative and regulatory requirements rather than 
evidence of what works. Regulators are waiting on researchers to tell them how to 
incorporate new theory into regulatory practice, and in the absence of this guidance have 
no choice but to base their rules on political priorities. Researchers can only conduct real-
world research that organisations are willing to fund and engage with [76]. Each party 
blames the others for the lack of empirical research and evidence-based practice.  
 
This excuse-making must stop, because even the status-quo provides many opportunities 
for Reality-based Safety Science research. Organisations are “experimenting” - in the 
informal sense of innovating - constantly. Even when organisations are merely undertaking 
common safety activities, these tasks are poorly documented in the academic literature. 
The current evidence base is so low that novel research data can be generated just by 
keeping good research records of current safety practice.  
 
No organisation - either business or regulator - needs permission from anyone else to 
collect data about its own activities. No organisation should be wary of seeking researcher 
assistance, because there is a direct financial return on this investment. Organisations are 
currently spending money on safety. It is unknown whether and where this expenditure is 
effective or needed. Better data collection will lead to either cost saving, or more effective 
deployment of existing money. 
 
The wariness to engage in novel safety research stems not from inherent structural 
constraints, but from previous insufficiently grounded safety research. Business and 
regulators are wary, with good reason, that “safety research” will consist of new tools and 
practices that are expensive to implement, rather than actionable information about the 
status quo [6].  
 
One early reviewer of the manuscript suggested that safety researchers could learn from 
Rasmussen’s safety envelope model [77]. The gradient of economic performance pushes 
researchers to create publications and attract citations. The gradient of least effort 
encourages desktop research based on accident reports, surveys, or blue-sky theorising. The 
only counter-gradient consists of researchers holding themselves and each other to 
account.  
 
We conclude this paper with a personal message to you, the reader. If you are a safety 
researcher, we ask you to take a position on the commitments in this manifesto. If you 
disagree with them, please feel free to debate them, in public. If you agree with the 
commitments, please say so, and start holding yourself, and us, to them.  
 
If you are a reviewer, please feel free to refer directly to these commitments when rejecting 
papers. Peer review should be respectful, constructive, and helpful. Allowing a fellow 
researcher to continue along a path of degenerate research is neither respectful nor helpful. 
If we hold to these commitments, the volume of published Safety Science research will 
decrease drastically. The journal publishers will not be happy, but the world will be a safer 
place. Which do we care about?  
 
If you are a regulator or funder of research, we ask you to prioritise work that aligns with 
the manifesto. Our intent with this request is not ideological purity. It is important that a 
wide range of methods, approaches, and conceptualisations are permitted within safety 
science. However, we believe strongly that work that does not follow this manifesto 
deserves a significantly higher level of scrutiny to justify its value.  
 
If you are an educator, we invite you to teach current and future practitioners how to 
identify and apply Reality-based Safety Science. We ask you to teach them how to recognise 
and engage critically with work that breaks the commitments in this manifesto. We consider 
it important for practitioners to understand when they are operating within the current 
evidence base – and should therefore be applying current theory – and when they have 
moved beyond the current evidence base – and should therefore be following good 
research practice.  
 
If you are a safety practitioner, we invite you so engage with safety science research.  
Contribute to our understanding of the real-world problems and practice of safety and 
work.  Support the development or meaningful research questions and research programs.  
Collect data.  Understand the genuine developments in safety science and incorporate these 
findings in your professional practice. 
 
If you are supervising young researchers, this manifesto is a demand, not an invitation. Do 
not allow their time and talents to be wasted. If the commitments aren’t quite right, we are 
willing to be corrected on the detail, but not on the overarching message. Safety Science is a 
degenerate research program. It must grow up in order to have a future.  
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